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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
It is necessary, when viewing a particular perspective
of the world, to define the limits of that perspective in
terms of some sort of finite base.
is arbitrary.

The choice of that base

Sociology, as both a methed of perception

and a collection of perceived data, has attempted, and is
attempting, to define the limits and boundaries of its
concern.

'fl —se boundaries art- ;.rhitrary constructs which
fre

ti-

historical z-hd sceio-cultural i'cc1.-

7,rounds or the individuals who have sought to define
phenomena from the stability of a finite base.

The choice

of a system of patterned thought, manifest in, and generated by,

ols, necessarily entails the acceptance of a

particular set of boundaries, within which communication
and perception is possible.

The sociologist must work

and from, this arbitrary system of thought and
symbol in order to limit the boundaries of his concern to
tn

realE of the fiEite.

The liTits :.:hich the sociologist

constructs for himself, the values upon uhich such defining
is based, and the (=sequences of the beurc:Lry definitions
serve as the broad area of interest within which this
5

presentation will find its emphasis of concern.
The socielogist who claims to be value-free has for
too long either ignored or denied the significance of the
value assuriptions upon which his particular view of the
world is based.

The internalization of the notions of

"scientism"1 has transformed, fer many sociologists, a
value based discipline, which finds its relevancy within a
particular historical and socic-cultural frame, to a perception of reality felt to be both immanent and transcendent.

The adoption of the notion of "scientism" as a value

77ase, with thc parallel pretense of value-free sociology,
;cssrved, ironically, to hinder the study of the value
•

fra7.c of sceigy, to limit the 77—:rds of perception and
interpretion to a rcw accepted procedures and concepts,
and to isolate the discipline frc:7. its historical and sociocultural environment.
Sociology has become in many respects, a perspective
which has tried to insulate itself against the necessity of
value choice and ideology.

In the very process of stating

its values so emphatically ("scientism" for example), it
‘t.

has tended to deny the influence of values upon its own

1Felmut Schoeck and James Wiggins (ed.), Scient sm and
Values (ew York: U. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 19b0), p. lx.
Scaoeck and Wiggins present scientism by stating that "the
word scientism conventionally 0.z-cril,es a type of scllarly
tipassing, of pseudo exactituc., of cmbracin.i7, incongruous
modt.is of scientific method and conceptualization. Scientisr-: fosters not only the 'fads and foibles' of contemporary
sociolcpy, but is also in itself a symptom of an insecure
world view, of a negative social philosophy."

•

perspective.

!y this (lenial, the discipline has incor-

porated the notien of value-free sociology and ethical
neutrality to the point that they have become, in many
respects two of the major value bases upon which modern
mainstream sociology is founded.
Brcadly viewed this presentation has grown as a reaction against sociological insulation, and is a basic statement and analysis of the relationship between ideology and
sociology.

It finds its immediate roots in the rejection

of the notions of "scientism," and posits the necessity of
ideologicr.1 c ,-cicc as the l)ase from which both action and
nerce,)ticn - re e:ciived.
tionshir which eists

Philescnhically, the posited re2:—
etwee7. racts ;:nd v.iues

s relatec:

to sociology) h; been drawn from the generalized notion of
-..he social construction of realit, which serves as a prime
postulate from which this presentation is extended.
The irrediate need of a discipline to establish sore
set of arbitrary finite boundaries should not be divorced
from the need to examine and analyze those particular
boundary constructs.

In establishing the limits of interest

and action of a particular discipline, we necessarily inude various phenomena within our realm of concern and
exclude ethers.

The bc;:ndaries ;,hich limit those concerns

are the constructs el- our peculiar perspeetive (discipline)
an

are the bzIsc: fouhc:ations wi thia which ceir

yerceptIcn must fall.

of

It is esseTitial that we who accept

the basic area and tenets of concern of each cf the

respective and varying disciplines (in this
case sociology)
must constantly evaluate the boundary cons
tructs that we,
ourselves, have constructed, along with
their accompanying
limitations.

71(2 (tuestien is not that the boundaries exist,

hut that they exist so often without
question.
It sees reasonable to state (at least from
the auther's
ideolcgical bias) that as the nature of what
is being
studied changes, the boundaries establis
hed for analysis
must also be flexible enough to change
in order to include
new and significant phenomena within the cons
tructs of concern.

It should be noted tnut the extension or
li-Ating ci

such boundaries of int.rest are dependen
t upon OLHsiens
which follow frc:: srbitr..z
pteL
;
tions.

It is one of the main contentions of this presentation thnt a discipline such as sociolog
y must constantly
refer to the socio-cultural circumstance
s within which it
operates, in order to make decisions conc
erning the expansion or contraction f the arca of phen
omena it is attempting to analyze and study. Relevancy, admi
ttedly, is a
valile based on an ideological assumption,
but within the
ccnfines of this presentation remains
a very important one;
one which establishes both a directio
n toward which it is
felt sociolcgr must mcve ,s well n;
a base from which it
must be extended.
This constant evnluation and reappraisal
of the
„
.)c -- nc.ar, constructs of cur disciili
ne is an area which ::
- as
leng been either blatently neglecte
d or somehow

-transcended" by the Platonic notions of "scientisr;.-

The

analysis of boundary constructs is closely related to the
concept that relevancy is found within a particular historical and !;ocio-cultural range of phenomena, and is viewed
as being based upon varicus ideological assumptions concerning the n-ture of reality (and more specifically the
nature of :,aman interaction and society.)
In order for alternative systems of thought to exist
within the same discipline the boundaries of concern must
he open and dynamic enough to allow for at least the possi•

biflty of alternative conceptuaization and perception.
The notion

:
.Lciolor
y is the study of concensus,' for

example, ne‘:(:ssar.: excludes an :: c roach within sociology
which tends to find its major en.phasis in the study of conflict.

The (.2..istence of varying scopes and emphases of

perception, as well as the possibility of conflicting or
contradicters: analysis, concerning the same or like phenomena, exists only within a discipline whose boundries
are broad enough to allow for the flowering of many schools
of theught.3

This emphasis on epenness, however, is often

threatening to the individual who is not able to cope with
ni

degrees of freede7 or to the discipline w!,:!. is so

;;irth. -Ccir:Fcrsus
Com7unio%tion,"
.2:Pr.ican
V-1.
. :-7.rth
stated, '7 rra T.1C s'17-7-,TT—of co:-zenus ns t
cortr,11 tas.L
of sociology."
fl no Ise-Tung, Quotations from Chairman ‘:ae Tse-Tung,
(Pcking: Foreign lailruage Presr, 19t6), p. 17)2.

insecure as to rely upon static boundaries to assu
re its
existence.
It is with these reactions in mind that the followin
g
postulates are prescnted as a statement of relation
ship
between ideology and sociology.

Included, as ;e11, is a

corresponding analysis of the conservative bias
of both
structural-functionalism and present day conflict
theory
(represented by Lewis Coser and Ralf Dahrendorf)
as rajor
ideological perspectives within sociology.

The examination

of the boundary constructs of sociology is an essentia
l
task in establishing priorities for research, theo
ry, and
7ethodolop.

The acceptance of existing hendaries as a

priori, u.-,questienabh, limits of concern, is one
nf tne
prime eler:.:7as in the development of an irrelevant,
stie
discipline.

The constriction cf alternative methods of per-

ception and conceptualization is a result of insulati
on and
the "scientism" prevalent in sociology.

The following

postulates, hopefully, lay the ground werl: for a
mere comprehensive examination of the boundary constructs
of scciology, specifically in the relationship between
facts and
values within an ideological frame.
There are several major tenets upon which this
presentation is rreunded.

These postulates serve as the inmediate

value base frop, which the writing of this nailer is
ctended.
r!

a;,c1

aps

ii'lrortant, is the acceptance cf the

notion cf the social construction of reality (and
percepticn).

This concert is presented from a predominantly

11
:lannhcirian perspective and is the prime po.,:ulate upon
which the relationship between fact and value is established.
Secondly, it will be held that the presented relationship between fact and value necessarily establishes an
immediate and i:.pertant
relationship between the boundary
constructs of a discipline and the values upon which such
constructicns are based.

This relationship is seen, and is

applicable, to the relationship between ideology and sociology.

Within this immediate framework, concepts are seen

as manifestations of ideology as well as generators and
Ltaintainers of existin;_; ,,erc%ntualization and ideological
perspectii.(:.
The third 77!-positen holds Ih..T there are two 77::4)or
ideological strains of thought and pe cepticn within cc
temporary American sociology.

These two inogical per-

spectives are as follows:
(1)

structural -functionalism (structural-functienalist theory)

(2)

present day conflict theory4

Finally it is posited that these two basic ideological
perspectives (stn:ctural-functionalism and conflict theory)
are "conservative" in nature.

This conservatism is not

only a logical extension of historically conservative social

'II is necessary to note 1!--.t this presentation
2rnws
i=ediate and necessary distition betwcn pres::1
conflict theory ala Ceser and Dahrendorf and the "c3assical" conflict theory of Hobbs, Darwin, and 71arx.
2%

thought 5 but is ;:lanifest in the predominantly
accepted
definitions of society and their logical perceptual
consequences.
The generally conservative ideological
Lase of sociological theory tends to manifest itself both
in approach and
theoretical direction per se. The concept of socia
l equilibrium often becomes, in respect to the theor
y and study of
society, an a priori assumption from which and
toward which
most theory and study is derived and directed.

The very

definitions of society accepted by most sociologis
ts limits
or excludes the concept uf a society • ':ose exist
ance is
7ased upon extended crd ccntinuous conflict.

•!ost defini-

tions of society can he viLLed as dervitives
based ,,71 the
generally accepted concept of equiliOrThm; a
tion whl_h
itself stems from traditionalist ideas of "harm
ony," "consensus," "like interests," etc. The concept
of functional
unity found within many definitions of socie
ty leaves little,
if any, room for a permanently dysfunctional
set of categories. The notion that society is comprised
of a number
of interacting functional units, which neces
sarily maintain
the whole, excludes the very concept cf a
society in which
units may exist for the destruction of the whcle
. The importance of ideology in relation to the develo
p::ent of a
particular discipline cannot be divorced fro7.1
the conceptual
5

nchert Nisbet, The Sociological Tradition (New
York:
Basic Books, 1966).

1:•
apparatus and methodological manifcstations of that discipline.

II should

rade clear, that the immediate purpose

of this paper is not the presentation of a new ideological
base frcr

the stady of society may be directed, but

rather an analysis of the existing discipline in terms of
categories of equilibrium and conflict as related to its
ideological

'411
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CHAPTER II
VALUE .1i) IDEOLOGY
The neeesity of value commitment within a historical
and social context cannot be isolated from the relationship
between knowledge and its social base.

Everyday individuals

are iced Lith decisions; decisions which are dependent upon
the values and definitions which are labeled as facts.

The

reality that is perceived and tl- c manner in vhich it is perc: iv

are both produ.:Tts of the social envilont into

which c

is socia::zed.

It is amazing th7.t

sol,L1loated as sociology .as eitaer largely Leglectcd
the study of its cun ideological base or

systematically

denied the relationship between values and facts as an intervening variable in the study of human interaction.
The non -pejorative use of ideology found within the
context of this presentation has grown basically from the
rejection of the notion that ideology is counte rposed to
science.6

This usage is based upon the concept that science

h.

':sathan Clazer presents three historical uses of the
term ideclogy: (1) ideology as coonterpesed to science; (2)
ideolc4_,y as the screen for the st:itus quo; (3) ideolol- y as
that ele7.cpt in all thought that ohi lizes the ferces of
cliage for the positive tr:.sformati
ci, of society.
Ol4zer's artic1( 1!.; found in The Uses of Se(:iology edited by
F. Lazarfold,
fl. Sewell and H. L. Wilensky, (i- ev, York:
Basic Boas), pp. 63-77.
14
4

4iirrairsar.—Pitwrirrwilm

15
itself is an idcoloy.

It is quite difficult to divorce the

ccncept of ideology irom previous historical misapplication
and to apply it differently to similar situations.

!arx,

for the most part has been the base from which the sociology
;91

of knowledge has been extended and in many ways provides the
concept of the social construction of reality upon which
this paper is grounded.

A strict Marxist definition of ideo-

logy, resplendent with orthodo
A'', •

class analysis, has been

rejected for this presentation, however, with the use of the
term idcology becoming closely aligned with :1annheim's concept of "perspective" found in Ideology and Utopia.

7n

refening te one's perspective :1annhei7 Freaks of a
'eltanschuung or total outlook which is brought to any
5;.

situation where t,re exists the necessity of interpret
ticn.

A perspective, thus, is a

c1e T:cde of conceiving

things which is determined by the social settings and determines the manner in which one views an object, Yhat one perceives in it, and hew one construes it in •s thinking.'
Following ::annheim, an ideology will be posited as an integrated set of beliefs with corresponding sets of values
;-i.ich connotes assumptions about the nature of reality.
This definition of ideology differs from the traditional
concept of a rigid dogmatism often associated with the
ter:', and is a co7:posit of definitions presented by `tarry

7

Karl 71annheim, ideology and Utopia: An Intycduction
to the Sociology of Knowledge (New York: Harcourt, r,race,
19o), pp. 266-'272.

Hausknecht

9
and William F. Connolly.

The relationship between values and facts as related
to a specific historical and social environment serve as
the base for assumptions concerning the nature of a perceived reality.

From this view of ideology there is an

immediate and necessary relationship between values and perceived empirical facts; a relationship which is contingent
upon the social construction of perception.

The notion

that facts exist in a system of "Platonic reality," devoid
of their necessary relationship with values, yet able to be
interpreted within the context of a social environment, has
in many ways become an assumption held by a large number of
social scientists.

1

The notion of a value free sociology

has itself become a predominant ideological assumption
(value) which serves as a base for modern mainstream sociology.
The image of a.value free sociology is more
than a neat intellectual theorem demanded as a
sacrifice to reason; it is also, a felt conception
of a role and a set of (more or less) shaTqd sentiments as to how sociologists should live."

1urry Ilausknecht, "Values and nainstream Sociology:
Some Functions of Ideology for Theory," American Behavioral
Scentist, vol. 9 (Feb. 1966), p. 30. "Ideology connotes a
set of values, i.e., assumptions about the nature of man
and society."
:=

9—

E. Connolly, Political Science and Ideology,
(:.ew Yorh: Atherton Press, 1967), p. 2. 'Ideology is an
integrated set of beliefs about the social zind political
environment."
"Alvin Gouldner, "Anti-:4inotaur: The .lyth of Value
Free Sociology," Social Problems, Vol. 9 (inter 1962),
J). 202.
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relation to a particular socio-cultural envirenment.

The

affirmation of a particular value has within it an inherent
scope of perception derived from the framework of the value
itself.

The areas that are to be studied find their origin

in the values which form the base of a particular perspective or ideology.
The predisposition to believe or label a particular
phenomenon as fact is based on ideological assumptions which
are the products of the sccial and historical environments,
and are the value bases which intervene in the perception
and interpretation of reality.

Within this perspective we

are able to view two different levels of relationship
between facts and values which intervene in and influence
perception:
(1)

Values that are derived from facts based on
an immediate a priori accentance of beliefs

(2)

Beliefs (facts) derived from values which
have grown from the prior acceptance of other
beliefs.

Both of these levels of relationship serve as the value
bases which become intervening influences in the interpre
tation and communication of perceived data.
The notion of value free sociology draws a distinction
between the value position of the sociologist cutcidc of
the role of the sociologist and the detached professionalism
posited as a requirement contained within the role of the
scientist.

Irving L. Horowitz has made an interestini, point

in stating, "The truth of course is not that values have

.11P011111,0,004r.•

19
1

actually disappeared from the social sciences, rather that
the social scientist has become so identified with the going
value system."

The social scientist does not leave his

values behind when he steps into the role of the professional.

any of the overt manifestations of political

affiliation and religion may be outwardly rejected, but the
assumptions upon which the outward manifestations of belief
are founded are brought to inquiry.
The social scientist at work is not suddenly
confronted with the need to choose values. He is
already working on the basis of certain values.
The values that these disciplines now embody have
been selected from the values created in Western
society; elsewhere social science is an import.
Of course some do talk as if the values they have
selected 'transcend' Western or any other society;
others speak of their standards as if they were
,!j.mmanente within some exLs.ting
n, ,pyrt
of unrealized potential. But surely it will now
be widely agreed that the values inherent in the
traditions of social science are neither transcendent nor immanent. They are simply values proclaimed by many and within limits practiced in
small circles. What a man calls moral judgement
is merely his desire to generalize, and so make
available for others, those values he has come to
choose.11
The social scientist is not an isolate, immune to the
influences of his particular culture and society.

The con-

cept of value free sociology alienates the scientist from
..3

the resource he is studying and divorces him further from
the surrounding world.

The scientist as a social person

participates in the selection of the problems of science

York:

C. tCri;ht Nills, The Sociological Imagination (New
Greve Press, 19€1), p. 178.

-r
and is responsive to what Znanicoki has termed his social
circle.

Whether :le considers himself a successful indi-

vidual in the treatment of a particular problem is dependent
upon the reacticn received from net only the immediate social
circle but frem the larger social forces and cultural goals
of his society rer sc.

The techniques used by the social

scientist a:1d the data retrieved are judged by an already
existing ideological base as either an acceptable method,
an operative value which predominates as a professional
standard, or as a non-acceptable method with invalid data
stemming froo a misuse or rejecticn of the eiFting predominate ideological 'case.
There is evidence that the so-called laws of
proof mov be r. relyconventional abstract
rules governio what are accepted as valid conversational etensions. What we call illogicality is sirilar to immorality io that hcth ;:!'e
deviations from norms. . . . Criteria, or
observational and verificatory models, are not
transcendental. . . . Nor are they part of an
a priori or innate, equipment of the "mind" conceived to be intrinsically logical.12
The technique, a complex of standardized procedures,
serve to make operative the predominant theoretical ideolooi.sal base.

The methods, which correspond to the theoreti-

cal assumptions are in themselves based on the assumptions
2enerated by the theory and thus
deter7.ined rosu]ts.

.:Ay tend to lead to pro-

Such a myopic rethodelogy sLrvos as a

suroportive structure for the ideological

from which it

he l;-.11:.,; to ;:,alntain the accepted structured view of
12
0o. cit., Connelly, p. 84.

reality.
The posited relationship between facts and
values presented in this parer is based on the acceptan
ce of a general
7!annheimian view of the social construc
tion of reality,
leading to the conclusion that the disjunct
ion between facts
and values present in the notion of value free
scciology is,
at least, improbable. The concept of ideology
as a necessary
base of perception is extended from the idea
of the social
construction of reality, and is in itself,
from this perspectike, a by-product r)f. 7. particular ideology
7. i
- ch has been
shaped by vrieus socio-ci!lturai
bistorical
Ideolo:: is,
of ]- crceptions
that knewlee

, rer: r:tcd ar

nicest in the arrangc.ent

label as knowledge and the 7anner in

hich

is collected.

The concepts upon which theory and research
are based
and from which both are generated arc subj
ect to the immediate influence of the relationship between
facts and
values.

The very concepts we use are colored, necessar
ily,

by the ideological predisposition to
view a particular
subject area in a particular way.
We
begin with the fact that the sare word
or concept in most cases, means differen
t things
when used by differently situated pers
ons. . .
even in the fornplation of cecepts, the
angle
of visien is guided by the observer's intc rest
s
. . .everv cecept combines ithi itself only
that which, in the light of the investito
r's
interets it is esr,ential
grasp and tc incorporate:1

Op. cit., 7!annheim, p. 273.

4.7- e sociolc:. ist, as dependent

:roator of,

the concepts used ,As a base for

reality is neces-

sarily ccpcient upon his social and cult1,:0: envirou,ent.
The ideols: of :he sociologist is i7e:lifest

thc

ment of the concepts he uses tc inteiTret HF• :erception ri
reality.

';:ch conce:-,ts serve as a su:psrt:::e. structure for

the i..,enertion and rlaintenance of 1:;.,t will
acceptc.

o presented as

eological assumptions.

ithin each word (concept) used to describe a per-

ceived phenomenc:1

various connotations and denotations

:I
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"vocabularies of

15

e:pressing an interpretation of

situated actions, maintaining a scope of perception for the
interpretation and relating of vurious phencmena, and generating a particular perceptual frame.

The value base of

perception is related to the value base of symbolic communication by tLt. simple activity of choosing a word to describe and/or c).plain a particulal' perception.

The

cation of ideological perspectives is necessarily related to
vocabularies of explanation and "motive" and is dependent
upon social Nature of perception and symbolic interaction.

15C. Wril,t Mills, "Situated Actions and Vocabularies
of :!otive,"
- ican Sociological Review, Vol. 5 (Occember,
l(2f40) pp. 9f'.1 -l7).

CaAPTER III
SCIETIFIC 1:I:IV:CATION:

THE ALIE\ATION OF PROLLSS

The categorization of perceived phencrenon into various
niches of criteria necessarily entails the standardization
of characteristics by which such groupings can be made.
The methodologies of classification and consequent
categcrization are important elements in the scientific process.
The base for

rl
,1AV

process is dependent- upc , definiticnal

labelnp nrrc,L.Jures and is intirint:c1,- related to the iohgical lolascs of

definer ar.C. t

the labclin: process.

involve0 in

The entire pr,:ess rf e]ssification

and categorization is based upon the construction of
definitions and groups of defined objects to be related in criteria of siiiality.

These criteria are themselves arbi-

trary constructs and are oriented toward the classif
icatic71
of like elements between separate entities.
It is F. A. Eayek's contention
"that the process of
creatin
a1ren.7

new criteria of classificatio.i anu redefining
defined perceptions is in itself an alienating fac-

tor further sepan,ting the "reality" of knowledge from

•

York:

4:U.t14,1 4 ,

Eayek, The Counter-Revolution of Science (yew
The Free Press, 1955).
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construction of similarities between
separate entities, and
is one of the main processes involved
in t c construction of
a separate "reality" of science.
The concepts used in establishing and
classifyi14; the
various perceived characteristics are
in themselves felt to
be "real" in the sense of being syno
nymous with experience.
The naive rez:lism which uncritically
assumes
that where there are commonly used conc
epts
there must also be definite "given' thin
gs
which they describe is so deeply embe
dded in
current thought about social phenomena that
it
requires a deliberate effort of will to
free
oneselves from it.
The creation of a "scientific real
ity" is dependent urcn
.,
..ntcatic% of the model construct with exer
ic:-- -, and
is represcnt;.tive
.hat Alfred
c.
"fallacy of r.,Isplaced concreteness."
There arc several lecls c

dir

at

scientific rcificatiun

related to the fallacy of misplace
d concreteness with which
this presentation wills deal. Richard
. Weaver presents two
types of vocabularies which the individu
al (including the
scientist) uses in the process of labeling
and classification of perception.19 These types of
vocabularies are
related to the levels and degree.: of
scientific reification
1.e11 as to the 1-:-cad relationship
between "reality" and
1:.s.uage en toto.

' id., p. 54.
19.
:!elmut Schccc and Jares 41.,L;gins, eds.
, ScicrtIsrValues (c.1.- York: O. Van Nostrand
Co. Inc.,

"Pc:;itive- terms, as Weaver presents them, stand for
perceived objects which are material entities, capal)le of
illysical identification and measurement.

In general

language construction "positive" terms are usually nouns
with the degree of disjunction between the symbol and the
referent (the entity to which the symbol refers) th ,,ugh
arbitni-y, being minimal.

"Dialectical" terms, on the other

hand, oriOnate and derive meaning on a higher level of
abstraction.

They emerge frcm the "world of ideas" and con-

sist of a meaning which is reached not through (normal)
sensory percerti,n,

.Lit through the processes of definition,

inc:usie• , exe2usion, and implieatien. 20
Wc;:vr re7

:F

to pc:At (at least through implication)

th:A thc closer the symbol is to the referent, in teims of
417.
'"•

icsL;er degrees of abstracion, the more representative that
symbol is to the "reality" of experience.

The higher the

level of abstraction the wider the disjunction between experience :Ind syml._01 construct.

"Positive" terms therefore tend

to be mere representative of the reality of experience since
they are on a low level of abstraction while "dialectical"
terms become more divorced from experience, through the comrl(xities of hi 4
, her degrees of abstraction.
compleities

f symbol

construction and its

-i-1,2cssnry relatirnship lith the entire process of scientific
t- iLtion is an essentiN1 cloi%,:nt in the inclased

p.

8.

disjunction between -scientific reality" and the "reality of
experience."

The collectivism of the scientific approach

further complicafes and multiplies the inherent isolation
between symbol ccnstruct and experience (perception).
The soLiologist is not immune to these basic ontological
and epister,ological problems concerning the fallacy of misplaced concreteness.

The very precess of developing a par-

ticular disciplinary jargon and creating a perspective for
the interpretation cf reality (the reality of experience)
4
1

necessarily entails a sociological process of reification.
Sociology, as all other perspectives which interpret and
define perception, constructs a sociolegical reality

74
abstracted from experience and dependent upch symbols an,:

ik
4

cc:;.cepts fr it

c,istence.

The rea]tv of ::::ciology is

abstracted reality in a dialee , cal sense (Weaver's U
tic) which often e:i—takes its own creations for the reality
of experience.

The concepts which are constructed are often

viewed as positive terms while actually, according to Weaver,
they are dialectical terms which have been nistal:en for the
positive representation of experience.

Too often the models

which the scientists (sociologists) in a sort of theoretical
game are transformed into what is considered to be a -real"
representation of perception.

In a Weaverian sense we move

from positive to dialectical terms with the t,
- - o realities
becoing confused.
"ihe entire sociological reification -process is based on
the transformation and movement from the -world" of h1:3;:an

--mitsir7.•remtr,WMPIPprrtillirafir"'

experince thrca0 inteIpretatic,n

catep,orization, to -j.e

reality of sociely.
• • .the world in which science is interested is
not that of our given concepts or even sensations.
Its air l is to produce a new organization of all
our experience of the external world, and in doing
so it has not only to remodel our concepts hut
also to get aay from the sense Tualities and to
reploce,;:hen by a different classification of
events."

•

The elenerts of the reality of s:-ciology are the definitions
anl concepts which are used to structure and interpret perception, and the perspectives which serve as referent points
for viewint: the world of human interaction.
tin

The construe -

:es of Lur..an interrclatips and experience

:ace

l process

- of

The ralse

Tierce a;, LeLeve tL,
(l'etrc for the

of se_.

icy is generally the maintchance of the sociological
reality.
The general creation of realities separate, but
supposedly reflective, of human expea- ience is a part of an
alienation process created by the necessity of syr,bolic
interaction (thou. complicated and rultiplied by the
fallacy of risplaced concreteness and the collectivism of
the scientific approach).

The self-isolating perspective

of the C,jectivo, value -free observer is Lut onc of the impol;sibilities 1,aectrtinf„., the sceial : -It711-o of perception)
scientit creates a dn-ncti;:n Lete
cx;,cricrice.

21 F. A.
!,dycl., op. cit.,

• •,

It is necessary when dealing on an onto1ogiez.1 level
epistemological concerns (especially from a meta-sociological perspective) to deal in dialectical terms while
analyzing a construction of abstract realiti.

it is with-

in this framework that this presentation will ccntinue to
analyze the reality and perspective of sociology and its
consequent conceptual manifestations as an ideology.

CilAPTER IV
IbLOLOGY AND REACTION
There arc two major sociological perspe..tives (ideoloe;ies) with corrospoLdin: ter:,inologies with which this presentation will be immediately concerned.
3.

Both of these

perspcctives ry be viewed as rajor directions within the
same sociological reality.
ihitations

t3n,
et

It is the

Boa are subject to the same
an(' the fail-cy
tb

rc ar:.itrari conceptuei ;:lodels

contention cf this raper that general

e(juilii- ri,A. LI ok:.s._%sos thcory is the pre:,;:.1 -,ant sociogical perspective from which observed phenomena are defined
and cat( cri -.

Flcsent dry ccL:'lict theory on the other

-.nu serves as thc suLordinant secondary factor of ideology
used as a referent point for classification of perceptions.
istoricaliv the role of equilibrium theory may be
tracct: througl:
Hi teoly.
(-A.
3:-

:load range of disciplines z,.:1,7 :pcncral
Ueveleping in the physical science:: prior to
Ck171CC i - t

t4...• estal:qL-cnt
construct serve:

a fir;ite

base for the Jc.: ctien of logical extensions (or exclusions)
31

of the unknown

1qu ii i r iuu

eca::,e the i..ethodc-

logical rrocess of inposing ordei and structure on an
alTarently chaotic universal condition.

The ntural and

physical sciences Lecame increasingly based en postulates
of equiliLrium and developed complex theore;.s and 3NiOES
frcm 1.::ich logical patterns and deductions could he projected.

The desired emulation of the natural (and physical)

sciences by the seeial also included the adaptation of the
existing "scientific" methodology, as well as the general
frame of reference of the equilPlriun perspective. - According
to Cynthia :iissett, —;he rise and di-s-inatIon of the conof

is : :rt of t!le

in r.cientific

The gencral trend Toward the discovery of a ronistic
explanation of a perceived universal system developed as
the intellectual atosphere from which the social sciences
Lere born.

The broad operational processes and harmony cf

the universal order were felt to he within the reach cf
hur,an understanding only if the methods of scientific classificaticn and categorization were employed.
i

Perhaps one

of the major intellectual transformations which grew out of
o:thi
of

cf

75

oe7.co

hysicA seiLnces rcl,t(: to the

nistic oriertatien vas 1.1:e
of equiliL1- 11

with the

on ismcf

LynthiED,Oc
The Cenceilt rf Fcluili7;rium in
A7ericun
lhour4ht (:,ev 1:a\ cu, Con:-.ecticut: Ya:e [Inc=
vcriTress,:777;—F. 14.

universal laws ef order.

The reduction of practically all

cf the scientific orientations to a

L.st1C base beTan the

widespread acceptance of the general notion of equilibrium
which wculd ireatly effect the scope and direction of the
develc.ent of the social sciences.
In :.;Latever form it :f:ight take, the doatrine
wa:, clearly favorable to the sharing of concepts,
rethods, and principles among diverse areas of k4iowle4e. Asserting that the sal_e laws operated in
every sphere of reality, it encouraged erployment
of identical methods of analysis and of identical
theories in every sphere. . . . Because the
natural sciences developed earlier than tie social
sciences, this borrowing of ideas perforce proceeded froif, the ferrer to the latter, rather thai .
the othcr ',:ay around. In extreme cases. .
borrewi::. ::.:-;-,mtej very nearly t
reduction of
sec- MI
to ics; in oth.:1- cases the concert.al
I. (f phy;ics was %ltered to
Cata."
lhe 1,'ea

catien and methodology

iad becc.c.e inraind theughtlays wit

scientist began to work.

ii the .ccial

With the acceptance of the broad

perspective of monism and consequent notions of equilihrium
•40

and order, the traditional conceptual apparatus and
F,ethodology of the physical and natural sciences were adopte
d as
tools cf the newer social sciences.

The collectivism of the

scientific approach per se was (and is) easily reconcilable
with the br(z-c-: r.c,:jstic perspective a:,0 consequent cc%cep
t
of couiliLrhiThe

tic major t,o,2i of science held.
af criteria cf
sciences by the

p. 26.

oeuld eal-ily be

-lase of

fre,

nu ronistiL :ase it

quite logical and - nott.ral' to lUL5 for the
tsse:,tial
ties of 1iLenL:,-. !- et- ween
Lt.nt or

,
011
4ALAA.

r

ent;ties throunh the estahlishaod cateorization.

The secloi seie:.ees readily o,I.opted t C;.e ...
- cral per!-Tecti .. .c of the aatura:

nC physical,

Lase and outleoi., a:,d the inLerent
eollecLivism.

For the socinl sciences the :7:option of

the general ideelogical orientation of to natura:
sciences
not only -ea::t the

of the stability or a:. neepted

systeL. or cle(:Ty
_ithoui thea

:crspectl..
t

_ :f a

-:teraative.

: t 7 c.:solvL,r. t

14.•

- rLality

or the ;u:l."ral sciences.

-.4

.e scope

::c

differ:..t

social

:.:ent of a
c,f an

for theory and riethod, did not taLe place.
Trncing the
711 7:e used as

;t:,c1e1e1„7y, Cov.te, 'Thencer, and
eAampl

Ab-Nsi

ent of an ioclei;v.

in th, :.:nalysis of the

7or

Co.71te the

rer HerLert Spencer the engineer, for Lester ';:ard
the
scie7tific categories had Lecor.:c central ways
of i=civin:
did not di\cHt
fr

c:osfyin

the input perceptions.

Thcy

of t: :r trndition,t: :.;.t.7.,eds or
catecrizuth.:11,

t

societ,
,
emul:Ition of the natural and :',hysical sciences
(especiall)

physical), Lased en tLe :,cne
,
ral perspective of a peitivisti,
-JnisTI and equil Lriun.

The eollectivis'l of the scientific

approach as related to the concept of equi
librium can be
seen in ,:o7:.te's notion of endeavoring to grasp
social rcno piena as - holes,' as well as his idea of the
unity of
unvaryin

natural lavs.

The n,:!ticn of equilibriur. was a ccncept and

nerc'leCtiVe

which was accepted as a base for viewing and cate
gorizing
perception which through widespread disseminatio
n, became
an ideolegy froli which and toward which the theor
y and
1--,:ti:cd of socieln:Ly grew.

It ,
- euld La'

Y.

been eKtremely
intell

de.:ept-

sociology and the —era?
to

c. :

, other direction.

The,12h a tr:"dit: n

did e..

t ;as ceitainly

of radier:1 cTill_.

not in the nainstream of the intellectual vogue
nor was it
the base frm which the natural and physical scien
ces could
logically be extended.
Corte reactd strongly against the Enlightenmen
t and
the French

evolution and posited that his "social physics"

(though he drew chiefly from a biological rode
l) would help
to 1)rin, order ol:t of chaos 27 Eis basic cons
ervative
interests cnabled

h

o readily accept thc stability of the

exis:tant sc;entific Fyste::, and tL, :,,,encra conc
l
ept of equi
ri

T:.

27Irvin

aat ref:

to

-

exter,s ion. of ':-.ur.lan

g ::.ietlin, IdeoloL: and the Development
of
Sociolegical Theerv (Enlewood
New Jersey: Prentice p. 75.

freedom and potentiality found within the bread revolutionz.:ry
views to which Comte was reacting prompted hi: to view true
liberty as -nothing else than a rational submission to the
preponderance of the laws of nature.',28
The biological model from which Comte drew his perspective of sociology enabled him to view the relationship
between two entities (the living thing and its environment)
as the pri;7ary base for societal study.

The biological

perspective of the homeostatic theory of organisms was easily
transferred to the social, finding a parallel theory in Comte's
idea of equilibrium.
Cor:tL. ei•;tomi:ed t e relatr
between living
thing: a;:.1 the:ncrld !r. which the:lived in a
sinnlc phrase: it as an
7 ' Ton tl•:e
Cortcin soc.12.1 statics concerned itse2i, by
definition, wAth the conditions of
••"- n

onte's primary perspective of human society was based on the
central :.otion of cy-.104, unity, and harmony.

The creation

of 1-,unan laws rercly reinforced t7le laws of order 'Ahich

We're

A.ready present.
•

All artificial and voluntary order is simply a
prolongation ef the natural and involuntary order
to which all Lo-aa society terds.30

,mt

The orzallic no‘:el which so fascinated Cc-...:tc way further
•

1
cc;te,
Paul, 1F,!1

Posith,:
n. 39.

2 von:. (Lon-

••

sett,

t7.:
'"•3

op._cit., T. 461.

•

7'7

c...pand:d and trnnsforned into sociolocal theory by ::Lrbeit
Spencer.

The basic equilibrium vie.

IC

and systemat-

ically dealt with in relation to the evolution and existan
cc
of human society.

1hough quite similar in content, Spencer's

physical and natural science referent was physics rather
than Lf(..logy.

Evolution (progress), however, fer!ained a

vital part of his general sche;-lata and became the central
principle within which the concept of equilibrium found a
:;iajor role.
Equilibri"r within Spencer's sociological perspective
had a t\:ofold role.

First, it 1.:z:s the forctJ through which

society .,:as ocr,stont

• pressis Cevolvinl

:10V

,

arose.

constantly

7-:- 5, 01.- %2

And secondly, it was the goal of that movement.

1:qui1ibr 4 um 1.)ee not only the recham el progress
but
the goal of that particular movement of societal evoluti
on.
Society, therefore as an organic and dynamic equilibrium
was perceived as a "system of mutually dependent parts
severally performing subserving maintenance of the ccmbina
tion."31
Given the perceived nature of the physical and
natural universe it became necessary for Spencer to broaden

„

the scope of equilibrium.

By adding the relationship of

evolution and Trc.:r(:, an aspect of functional unity
of
ele:,ental parts to the notion of equilibriur, he constru
cted
a societal parallel te complii.:ent the physical and
organic

31:lu3sett, op. cit., p. 38.

411.,

edels from Aich he drew.
The movement involved in the idea of progressive or
evolutionary equilibrium added a new dimension to the genera
l
applicability of equilibrium theory to socilogy.

In the

e sense that wonism became the base for the projection of
scientific 1:ossibilities for the natural and physical
sciences, equilibrium became the base and general ideology
within which the social sciences could logically operat
e.
While so quickly criticizing the negativism of radical
philosophy for its supposed determinis, the L'eterminisn
inherent i!

.!!), conceptual monistic fra:le was ignored.

very net ion el' universal laws !!eccs:7.aril;
of infinite I:edom and C.ance

The

:Le idea

i:7poses upon a -niverse

of chaos, :11.Ltion and pre -determined nredictibili
ty.
Science is bas .7 cn the necessary acceptance of imposed order, if only in theory, if any system -of logic is to
be
extended and for any creation of sy7bols to exist.
The arrival of equilibrium theory on the American sociological scene can be exumined in relation to the developent
of the sociological perspective of Lester F. Ward.

Ward,

emerging from a natural science background into the social
sciences, held to a strict monism
o co:Icept

central to his !,ocielogical perspec-
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t, cnty definitions
itjn select
i%troducto.. socielofy texts
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. . .Fron the standpoint of collective behavior
cultural traits may all he reduced to thc one term
-consensus.- Society viewed ahstractly is an organization of individuals; considereO concretely it is
a complex of organized habits, sentiments, and
social attitudes --in short, consensus.-)"
Lewis hirth has also i.aintained that the ccntral focus of
sociology is the study of consensus.39

This tremendous

erinhasis en thc consensual frame extended fro: the broad
action of equilit,riu

has 'ecomc the theoretical and methodo-

logical base for the predominance of structural -functionalist
theory in contel:Torary sociology.
Structural-functionalisn appears to he the logical exensioa anL parallel of the general
refernc

ilibr

frame of

I iu in tlic e.r1y,:...-clopzA:nt of :..-;cc:oicy.
raluns,

etends the notion of dynamic equilihrium

J;-:

consensus to

/he point of creating an almost monistic preoccupation with

(_onceptual eleme.lts
tioned in the definitions
of society surveyed
Syste

3

rs 1f

;sumber oi
definitions

7

::7uf1icient

4

InIt,:n„StS

Authors

1-Ichter; Bertrand;
Bogardus; Cuter
Levy; Landis; Johnson;
Woods; Nesanz; Pines;
7!ead (Eugene and Fanchon)
Lundberg, Selrag, Larsen; Vader Zanden;
'oods
lose; "crrill: Wilson;
C;reen: 7ichter; 1.;iesanz;

E. Parl: and: E. t';. Burgess, Introduction to the
Science of Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
p. 16.1.
3n--

cit., pp. 1-15.

Anrr

order and stal!ility.

In Cuser

the

C.' 4 1- c-.0

role that

plays a! a base for socioleic-1 analysis,
-11 as the

LS

any other social sciences, lavid Easton reLarheA

(refering tc
• • .it represents perhaps one of the few analytical uiit;tjcnskc (Al to all social iesearch. .
thc•17
11 iri
stnds at tie clo:-est
atic.n
to
,c.‘,Iera:
eery ll.at.cz.n lc found
",vA
in tic
field of social science--'
Thc 11; itLd l'onistic lase fro..1 wIlich present day equilibrium and consensus theory is extended is manifest ;.arisedly
t.,

in the scope and tradition of thk structural-functionalist
_pproa,:h.
:elati

4
I'

hat- stated i.ile

1:1 1

.Lon

r histrical

el( c:

f--;ct

lis

i:e:71. •

. . to. .ic postulates, those of consensus and
of dyna: ic equililriuT1 or itegration. Poth of
these ass, .pt ions can Lc traced !acl, to Cor..te, and
have peri.ctid Luch of Pritish
"alerican sociology and anthrwology. . .acquiring the sanctity
of traditions.'
The Lasie eollcctivisr. of the :-.onistic pelz,pective is
ckident In structural-functionalis

reductienist tendencies

toward the integral unity of functional elements.

This

collectivism coupled with the monistic equilnricn7. outlook
7ives the structural -functionalist approach characteristics
co:...lon to the latie, eihteen'H

id ':;!StLF,

-;cience,'14

cLwtry sciences.

The

!:e
i or''cience C;pril, 1::1 ), pp.

1A:2.

!erre van den Lerghe, "i!ialectic and Functioralism:
a ciyntLesi:;," .',;.;erican Sociological TIeview, 23 (Cctaer,
12)67),p. 6(_;6.
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ilu.;cnt da; cqui: —,
:in--,ensenso-, perspective (L.anifest in
!
,truct.:al-fantionalisv-) in a !iilar

:ncr maintains tile

conservatism of thc early discil.linary development and perpctuates a !.i -rilar systematic preoccupation with crder.42
While t7fing to maintain a professed standard of objectivity the struclural-functionalist often regards rapid change
as being dysfu2lctiona1.43

With function as a majer clement

of egallibria:. and stability, dysfunction necessarily assumes
a negative connctation with its logical consequence being
intability and disunity.

It is necessary for the structural -

functionalist to :ake value judgments if they are tc doscriLe
any catecri:;:le!: of perceived phenomena.

Ferce:.t ,as arc

asder:j as positive frur:
cal b - sc, ur fy: that matter

el- t1;fl

neutral.

ideoleSt.i5ity for

the structa:a2-4:anctionalist is a major concept wilt
favorable connotaticns, whereas dysfunction and instability
receive negative perceptual judgment and within the broad
range

the perz,i -,..tive are negative terms (1- lues).
The structuial-functionalist ideology was spawned fiem

pi
;-4

a conservative reaction to the Enlightenment and the French
Revolution.

its roots lie in a conservative equilibrium

tradition based on the collectivism and monism of eighteenth

42. .
.Lce,t A. ..'.gbet. "Conseis'tisr and Sociolc,7y,cza „lcalna: of auci,logy (Septel_aer, 1'.3S2), pp. 169-175.
,ar,.ns, "Soc an,idoratie,ls on t!:c
.ocial Change,' nar-1
':c1. 26 (Septc:-...ber,
F• 21c..'-239 and in den berghe. cp. cit., p. 698.

-

c

of

44
century science.

Thout h adjust;

deal :ori

cenvinc_ingly with the notion of change, 1:

ssic e.

hasis

on the equilibriul of society an:. the mai%:_sance of erder
re.lalas t't lase Cor nest all structsrs1-_,...... nal theory
and research.

This -Utopian" notion ef stability44 ::.anifests

itself in the riajor conceptual tools of sociology.

The very

ccseept of y:utual dependence, ,:ith an extreme ci;Thasis on
systems analysis, has become associated quite regularly with
the equilibrium approach.
The historical development of the structural-functionalist
auproach is in actuality the history of an idec ogy 1.ith con,:::::cdtaal tools and pens.
;
research and theeu- .

In

any

Ci the :cvelcp
,

men: of sociology reflects the censervatis. of eighteen
century sc:cntific collectivis

snd

feend its

most immediate expression in the equilibrium and consensus
theories so vital to structural-functionalism.

As Re)ert

hibet remarls,
The paradox of sociology. . .lies in the fact
that although it fails, in its objectives and
in the political and scientific values of its
principal fiures, in the mainstream of modernism,
its essential concepts and its
perspective places it much closer, gcrlerally speaking,
philc,sophieal conservatism.
Cno

14

.,

.ahikndorf, 'Cut of
of ,:ecloloic
(Scptt,L1,
IT. 1:s-isi.

Tol.ar.: a '. - eerientaJoarnal of Srciolc,

Letere -isset, The Socicio,:ical Tradition (New York:
FLsie Books, lrut-,), p.97.

'-4

cm1,717
cr cc:TLIcT
.strcsting to note
(via :6;.to, Flonccr, and yard) as a conscrvativc
r,Lcticn to t.:c :.z_nifestations of revolution, Me
71- Lnc:.
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2cos nut rit,atc... tilc radical
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structural-functionnlist ideology.

Though present day con-

flict theory does offer a varying set of conceptual tools
with different connotations and denotations, its base is
still built upon the static traditions of eighteenth century science.
The historical forms of conflict theory are
not sir.:ple historical curiosities, they for:,; a
developing tradition. . . . Conflict theory
arose in the general ideological a/Tosphere that
gave birth to positive organicism.4°

ph. -

Forming within the same intellectual atmosphere, much
or the radical critical philosophy of the latter eighteenth
early nineteenth centu:y took on thc menistic characteristics fre,_

iiich equilibrinr1 theory cmered.

The general

Ne4,elian dialectic was based ci the "absolute'. evclutic%ary
(progressive) move77tent toward what flcl tcr,lieLl as Spirt.
Even in the gener:il transformation of th

in dialectic

into dialectic materialism by Marx, the basic monistic frame
of science became translated into the inevitibility of
his
At the end of all the dialectic movement (both Hegelian
and 'Iarxian) is stability.
ih7

The progressive evolutionary

characteristics of negation were arbitrary stopped by both
theorist; Hegel with Spirit and .!a.rx by cermunism and the
withering away of the state.
cr-

`Iarx, however, did modify the

ticln of his diAectical prc.,:csF se that

T.Yr'CCSS of 1-( L tic__;. c(-1:7t1 cease

4r,.;,)!1 '7zIrtii:dale,
Theory Uoston:

The :Thtuit
Foughton

thudcc.

.ically the
of a

Tv_i-es of Sociological
Co., 160), p. 176.

classle!-s society.

Lven through the negation processes of

the necessity cf -cvolutien found within "arx, the conservative intellectual and societal frame within ,hich he was
orking did necessarily influence his perspective.
iy and large sociological conflict theory
has found its lodestar in stability. Precisely
because of its acceptance of the universality of
conflict, the vdication cf society is found in
achieved order.47
Given the inherent conservatism of a broad Hegelian and
':arxist frame, the extension and development of a revolu
tionary dialectical perspective did offer the possibilities
of an niternative sociological ideology fre:. .hich to classify

phc:, • cna.

The :

- 17 .-.:ical

jhy of

neaticn ':0 offcr as , :-1:e
thLor>.

s
.

./100&. 1-"C

focus

sci—hee

..ou,d necessarily hve chringe.i, the pe,sibility cf creating
an alternative scientific method based upon inherent develepmental processes of negation of organis7s (entities) rather
than collectivism did (does) exist.
parallelif.

Sociology, 1.0hCIY,

its predecessors did not develop along those

particular ideological lines.

There is vithin the disci-

pline thcugh a partial viel. of the ideclegical perspective
hich col.Alt.: have bccore the pre;:-

ideo.lc,:,ical frame

sociology if w.erc fully develc:cd 1-1-cr a Liffercnt philosGphical ground.
If

JO'

ings1e

:tavis asserts, sociology

47Ih1d., p. 206.

2r-

ac -.:ally

functionalisnl disguising itself ti rough merely the guise c;
a different label as has been al..!,trted 48 then all intradisciplinary approaches are logically the consequent of the
functional ideology.

Even if, however, the assertion of the

synonymous relationship between seciology and functionalism
is rejected, the negation of the immediacy of the
relationship does not necessarily follow.

The base of much of socio-

logy is grounded deeply in the functionalist approach.

The

question that must be answered if some understanding of the
relationship between functionalism and its related parts
(consensus and equilibrium) is to Le derived may be stated
as follows:

Is the relationship between the functionalist

base of sociology and equilibri..

neLtssary (7,1c if socio-

logy is to rzintain even the ac:,;'ta%cc of uhat it
traditionally interprets as the scientific o.;tiook?
word's, does sociology necessaril

In other

have to preserve its

equilibrium outlook even if it maintains the traditional
functionalist base?
There are several possibilities w7lich arise that r2.1,
serve as answers to the above questions.

4

Conflict theory

as it new stands works primarily from the same type
of ideological scientific Lase as does structural functionalis
m.
Though immediately grounded in the sa...ic (or simila
r) philosophical process the emphasis ten2.7 to becorc soncLow
48

Bert Adams, "Coercion and Consensus Ihcories: Some
%resolved Issues," American Journal of Sociology, Vol.
71,
p. 715; and Kingsley Davis, "The '3.th of Functional
Annlysls
as a Special '!ethod in Sociology and Anthropology," A;
.lerican
eciological Review, XXIV [December., 1959), p. 771.
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:,;.rt in Cosor's ;ash: persF,ective the
docs nc

;,
- .!cessarily eNclu

or

limit a functionalism based also on eonflict.

Coser has

negated the necessity of equilibrium from the general functionalist perspective, as '!arx was able to do prior to the
rise of the identification of functionalism with equilibrium
The relationship between functionalism and the concep
t of
conflict is as valid as the overly propogated notion of the
identity between equilibrium and functionalism.
Coser elaborates from a Simmelian frame upon the functional aspects of conflict in his book The Functions of
Social Conflict.

Though he is trying to develop a viable

intra-disciplinary approach for the classification of perceived phenomena. he is still -:orling fre
base.
r.-o

a conservative

Coser's notions of equiliLrium as well as conflict

primarily centered around a structurvl-functionali.st

perspective.

Cosr works from the :sumption that conflict

can be justified (as if it had to Le) if it contributes
to
the functional aspects of an existant society.

The nega-

tive connotations of the relatienship between dysfunction
and conflict are very much evident.

Coser constantly tends

to base the "positive" aspects of conflict on function.

In

a sense he is saying, if conflict has a social function
then
it can't he all had; dysfunction is positive only when
it
Las function.

The negative value ascribed to conflict and

cent dysfunction is maintained and tl.J.erred fror:
the
appr:ch
to what is presented as present day conflict theory.

The

sinc, conservative preeccupations with stability and
order is

rlaintained througheut Coser's (Simmel's) view of conflict.
The :'.anner in -hich Coser deals with conflict could
easily serve as an elaboration on the notion of dynamic
equilibriur.

The

io1oLical theory of homeostatis rcga-

tionships translated into sociology by Comte and Spencer
is similar to dynamic equilibriur:, in many respects.

The

::.ajor factor of dysfunction within thc Lie-system is the
over development of onL particular force in relation to
another.

A disequilibrium or conflict arises.

The entire

process of conflict is,actally a process of movement toward
J renewed state of :quili'.1rium.
in

sane manner, cc—Tlict arises out of

,.:see:.::liUrium and li a process of adaptation to a
ri..no

state of eq:.4ilflirium (lattni conflict).

tnereft:re seen

Conflict is

beneficial when /clated t.,;
- internal adaptation directed toward equilibrium; -1f.1 an equilibrium similar
aF

to a Parsonian perspective.
One safe2uard against conflict disrupting
the consens:!%1 Tasis of the relationship, however, is contained in the social structure ltsy'f;
it is provi.led Icy the ;nstitutionalization and
tolerance of conflict.°°
The various aspects of conflict which are perceived as
disruptive are

Coser, as the structural-functionalists,

.a.ladaptive ele;-..cats
:irrclenc

entire social systen..

The

_ev,r, ;c:wicn conflict theery (L:n (oser) and

49Le.,is A. C.r.r ,ihe Functions of Social Conflict (New
Yor: ;he Free Pro,, 1Y:16), p.
p.

structural -functionalism is the consequent posiive aspects
of the maladaptation (conflict) as viewed by Coser.

In a

similar 7.anner what may normally be labeled as a major func•
ticnal eleent by structural-functionalists is presented by
Coser as havin;:, dysfunctienal consequences for the total
social system in the long run.
Institutions k,hich offer substitute channels
for the release of aggressiveness Lay be dysfunctional for Cze social system in the sane way as
neurotic symptom§ i are dysfunctional for the personality system.
This juxtaposition of the functional elements of conflict and the dysfunctienz,1 aspects of functicnal elee,
!ts
can be translated

the simple, t1-,cugh nut

:cfuund,

stater%e:A that functional cieLr:s are funcIlenal ,
une evsfunctional elements ate dysfunctional.
Coser is try114, to maLe simply is that

Mc point that
:It was perceived

and labeled as usually functional elements are not necessarily static in those functional qualities.

;That we label

as dysfunctional usually may, lnewisc, also have functicnal
aspects at times (more often than not in the long run).

The

base for his qualitative judgement of function, ,ewexer,
retains the same criteria of secietal stability and maintenance

as

the traditional equilil,rium perspective.

. ..conflict tends to be dysfunctional for a
social structure in which tl:cre is no c: _rsufficicnt toleration and institutionalizatien of
inflict. The intensity cf
threatens to 'tear apart,' YLich at acs the

51 Ibid., p. 46.

censensual iasis of a social syster,
is related
to the rigidity of the structure. What thre
atens
the equilibriu
a struet.,:e is net conflict as
but the rigidity itself which permits hostilities to accumulate and to be
channeled
along one major ii,ne of cleavage once thcy
break
out in conflict.'
It is evident that the concerns of the
structuralfuncticnalist, the preoccupation with the
sanctity of equilibrium, is also a major concern for Loser.
Equilibrium is a
state of beir4; which is threatened by dysf
unction, it is
not the state of being which adversely effe
cts the general
process of ccnflict. His priorities are esta
blished. His
conceptuzil tools are reflective of the gene
ral notions and
ephasis of the structural -functionalist.
Though Coser
.cessity of the relatici,
. ship between functional is:. al.:

is strongly influenced Ly its

broad operaticnal scheme.

Conflict and equilibriu!Ti tend to

become ele;:tents in a dynamic equilibrium
maintained within
the general tradition of the structural-f
unctionalist ideology.
Coser in :,any ways has dealt more effectiv
ely with the
process of dynamic equilibrium as related
to conflict than
have many of his forebearers. Though not
presenting very
nueh of an alternative to conservative cons
ensual based
sociology, he has atte:Tted to deal nore conv
incingly with
various :-spocts of function and dysfunct
ion in rtin
te the h' r'j Lot icr f cr_f:',t. A.s- a conf
lict fanctionali.,t

u a

„

2
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Loser has demythicalized the coatructed necessary ralatio
nship between function and equilibria:'

nd has added at least

another divension to the predominant ideological base
of
sociology.
In the er,crgence of what is held to be present day
conflict theory 7:alf Dahreadorf has arisen as one of the
lcading conflict theorists, present in

„r

a revitalized "thcory"

class and class conflict in industrial society.

article "Out of Utopia:

In his

Towards a Reorientation of Socio-

logical Analysis," iahrendorf calls for a re-examination
of
the prcdominance of equilibrium theory and a new
effc.:: to
rccoaatitute sociolc_a: thrcagh a r:.or of chanz,e a a_ conflict.

The ho

7c;..

sms1

analysis

c)f dic-aili-

briaa thcary is oatwardly roject,d fci its inabili
ty te.
handle t.L coaL(nt of change and for 11.s static actions
concerning conflict.

For Dahrendorf a more realistic view

of change and conflict,can be found in the expansi
on and
7.odification of a basic ,Tarxist analysis of class and process.
Though outaardly rejecting a :Tarxist approach in the
conceptualization of societal (class) structure and change,
in ,:lass and Class Conflict in Industrial Societics,
Dahrenderf in eEsense tends to present a acdification net
rcjection
of —arxisI class thcory.
cTh

his aaalysis of ::aryaist tacts of

ia relatica :o newly ariscn TIodificaaions in indus-

trial acciety is wall grounded.

The needed e7phasis on roots

of powcr and authority as related to control
versus ownership

55
of the means eC production becomes inclusive ef a new development within conte7porary industrial scciety, the rise cf the
managerial class.

The concept of a ranagerial elite with

consequent 1,oler through control :iet

.as dealt wit!,

in 'Iill's Pcv:cr Elite and White Collar (especially in the
latter) .ut
.
is related more thoroughly to basic — arxist tenets
by Dahreneorf.
Throughout his work Dahrendorf concerns himself with
the new developments of class structure and industrialization
in relation to mere traditional interpretations of class.
!-:odifications or additiens of the cutgrowths of the
rise c

hc

the cor.lIel

Jarer:.:1_ -elite" in roI:.tion to the notion of
I the neans cf Fi. odoction is th

.gical exten-

sion and --eotLr:t of the expansiAe development of the Middle
class en tote.
Though Dahrendorf does deal much more effectively with
the notien of conflict (class conflict at that) and recognizes the basic radical critical traditicn of

arx and Hegel,

there are several major preblems with which he is confronted
and does not resolve.
The 3round from which narx drew his notion of the inevitibliity oi class conflict and chone was the necessity of
the dialectic.

The inherent neEotion of existing particu-

l-rs of a !listoric•1 moment is the loiical ant gret:1 of
the prooe.-7s of the dialectical "law.

The noticn of eloss

conflict was merely the extension of the logicality of the
dialectic.

The ground for !:arxist class analysis can be

feund in its philosophic base--the process c:f inherent negation and "going beyond" the cxistont to its legation.
Throoh the ideological acceptanco of the dialectic a base
for an intra-ideological logic Lnd categori:::tion
iihrc:Idorl through his rejection of the dialectic di:card
s
the bast_ fion which the logic of class analysis is extend
e.i.
:ithout the construction of a new philosophic base the logicality nf class conflict boccries n part of a non-exist -.nt
theoretical syste;,. and becomes acceptable as an a priori
particular.

Dahrendorf needed a system of thought in which

his modified class analysis woulc: fit.
to

re turned rcadilv

the e:,i'taat str7:ct,r::1-functier:-::ist fr
alteratic7. :r thc

arxist c7

, tonct

a..ld the :ejection

of the :7arxi:-t plii*sophid base, he modified
and

:0 t.

point that it could

riI

inc a

functionalist frame provided that there was not the immediate necessity of an equilibrium base.

The rolo

f inhercnt

conflict was borrowed from Marx and adapted to the notio
n
of dynamic equilibrium so that total equilibrium or balan
ce
would he impossible.

Dahrendorf's concept of the adaptation

and institutionalization of conflict was integrated
into a
functionalist framc and lecame similar to Coser's
c teorization of conflict functionalism.
. . .a strcr,g, case can bQ Liado for group conflict
having colvequences 1.:hich, if not 'functional" ore
utterly neccry for
social procet.s. This
eac: rests on the distinction !letween the two
faces of society—a distinction which underlies
our discussions throughout this study [Class and
Conflict in Industrial Society]. It is perhaps

proof of the necessity of distinguishing tese two faces that conflict itself,
the crucial category in terms of the coercion
codel, has two faces, i.e., that Of contributing
to the integration of social "systems" and that
of Eaking change.
actigh illerendorf have been at.lirably
expre5se:1 1.y L. Coser. . 5'
)
Though laarendorf is net as preoccupied with the notion
of equilibriur (even inclusive o

conflict as Coser) he

l'eards the re ,nlatiun of conflict as a function of
institutions.

lie deals primarily in the legitimization of

conflict behavior which 1:econes an accepted (adaptive) function

or

the social systl, and relates it to the notion of

-de - ociatic

r,(ility.

The more flexible (de..fcr

;

the

'

neti.': of dyi a .1. discquili-

briur. or inbalance in the structural-functionalist approach
tho,:gh

T

ic

theory conflict can-it

c resolved,

just regulated.
From a functionalist perspective a major function of
1,- 7;(

precet- ses of equilibrium is the resolution of

cchflict situations (disequilibriur) which night arise.
ri . s process c:; of internal adaptation do ttzLo place herercF
3E

c.c.,r1ict (In :isegoi2ihri.ir) and syme

5troctur.11 man:fe,ti,tions of t:.c

r'.•;

3 1a1 Iilahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrir.1
(Stanfor:. California: Stanford Iniversity Press,

‹ystem do take place.

The notion of internal resolveLent

of ,:ysfunction and conflict is a prirc eicent ia many
theories of equilibrium, organicisT, anL! structural-functionalism.
Dahrendorf ,:cals in a sir.ilar manner with the role of
institutionalized conflict as an e::arple of internal conflict
regulation.
The place of legal institutions in conflict
regulation is rare accurately descritcd, however, 54
by what in industry is usually called arbitration.
This example, as well as all of the three forms of conflict
regulation which 1;ahrendorf presents tend to worl, fru.. the
intra-c

notinns of the

perspectitc.
angc

is

.al-functionalist

tradicticns

of t1,-

to .Lether

s...stcy.
.
or within

ici

by identifying both cateporizatinns of cLnnie as the
S5
care.
The internal regulation of conflict for Dahrendorf is
rani lest in the structure's ability to adapt and control
the
extent and intensity of the conflict.

Though Dahrendorf

does not present the notion of the possibility of resolve7,ent, the reasons for the inherent conflict between elercntal
forces within the system is not presented.

The necessity of

cc:.flict found within the Marxist philosophic base is not
to
'L fc„:11.: in the philosophic ground of structural -func
tionalism.
T!.cuFl- cr7nflic ,
-- can be readily justified and explained 1.ithin
"
/Lid

p•

229.

5511-)d., p. 210.
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functionalism and 7Tarxist social thought, Dahrendorf is left
in the predicament of explanation without necessity.

The

conservatism he rejects in the functionalist approach he
reconstructs in his new conflict functionalism via the
institutionalization of conflict and the intra-structural
systemization of conflict regulation.

The radical critical

ideology from which Dahrendorf works to extend his basic
class analysis (arxism) becomes lost in the legitimation
of conflict through arbitration, conciliation, ar.d mediaLion.

The revolutionary character of :Tarxist analysis

(in spite of its many conservative elements) has been transformed by :lahrendorf into the idcolog
Crder ant:
regulation.

c: "liberal" socio-

, the lodestar of conflict

For Pahrendorf conflict may not be resolved, it

;hay still re -::..ain

:1.cat inherent tensinn within the exis-

tence of the social system, though the overt manifestations
of disequilibrium and conflict must be regulated.

The con-

servatism of the structural-functionalists and of the
theories of equilibrium have been transformed by Dahrenclorf
into the liberal ideology of contemporary sociology; a
liberalism based

a conservative reaction to the develop-

ment of a revolutionary perspective.

4
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1-,ersiLetive the purimse of this presentatien

r

:,as been ..:ofold:
I.

To examine, in part, sociology as a discil_:line
and as an ideology;

2.

To oxin:dne so:e of the processes involved in the
fr- -;- ,;.,;.ion of an ideole,; in relation te the class and ,.rran2,ement of po.- ceived phenov,Lna
- iclo:. al

L

or,..:er
as an 1

anal:

„le fully the role of sociology

010,y so.c
of tc processes of ideological formar

tion wer,_- presented in Chapters II and III.
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modifications have taken place and a new concern for meta disciplinary examination has arisen, t.le mainstream of contemporary sociology continues to find its ideological Lase
in the root

".

e

of reaction.
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